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The study reported herein is a subset of a larger investigation on the role of automation in the context of the 
flight deck and used a fixed-based, human-in-the-loop simulator. This paper explored the relationship 
between automation and inattentional blindness (IB) occurrences in a repeated induction paradigm using two 
types of runway incursions. The critical stimuli for both runway incursions were directly relevant to primary 
task performance. Sixty non-pilot participants performed the final five minutes of a landing scenario twice 
in one of three automation conditions: full automation (FA), partial automation (PA), and no automation 
(NA). The first induction resulted in a 70% (42 of 60) detection failure rate with those in the PA condition 
significantly more likely to detect the incursion compared to the FA condition or the NA condition. The 
second induction yielded a 50% detection failure rate. Although detection improved (detection failure rates 
declined) in all conditions, those in the FA condition demonstrated the greatest improvement with doubled 
detection rates. The detection behavior in the first trial did not preclude a failed detection in the second 
induction. Group membership (IB vs. Detection) in the FA condition showed a greater improvement than 
those in the NA condition and rated the Mental Demand and Effort subscales of the NASA-TLX significantly 
higher for Time 2 compared Time 1. Participants in the FA condition used the experience of IB exposure to 
improve task performance whereas those in the NA condition did not, indicating the availability and 
reallocation of attentional resources in the FA condition. These findings support the role of engagement in 
operational attention detriment and the consideration of attentional failure causation to determine appropriate 
mitigation strategies.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Inattentional blindness (IB) is a visual attention failure 
that can occur under periods of high and low workload 
(Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Mack & Rock, 1998). IB 
occurs when observers fail to notice the presence of a clearly 
viewable but unexpected event when cognitive resources are 
diverted elsewhere. Errors and accidents attributed to IB have 
been identified across context and environment (Simons & 
Chabris, 1999). The information gathering conducted in the 
aviation environment is primarily visual and potentially 
safety-critical, thus requiring a better understanding of the 
natural tendencies and tolerances of the visual system. 
A large human-in-the-loop experiment was conducted in 
three stages to evaluate IB in an aviation context. The first run 
explored if low workload conditions found in highly 
automated environments could produce an IB occurrence rates 
similar to those observed during high workload conditions 
(Kennedy, Stephens, Williams, & Schutte, 2014). The second 
run attempted a second IB induction with a highly task-
relevant critical stimulus to explore IB rates and detection 
group memberships changes. This paper discusses the second 
run, specifically, the findings of participants who experienced 
the repeated induction of a second IB elicitation attempt.   
Inattentional blindness. When objects in the world fail to 
reach conscious perception, individuals base their subsequent 
decisions on partial information. Simons (2000) noted 
observers must be aware of objects to make volitional changes 
in behavior. Failures to perceive visual information can occur 
when such information is relevant, detectable, and within the 
useful field of view (Mack & Rock, 1998; Simons & Chabris, 
1999). Inattentional blindness (IB) is the failure of observers 
to notice the presence of a clearly viewable but unexpected 
visual event when attentional resources are diverted elsewhere 
(Mack & Rock; Simons & Chabris, 1999). In this case, 
observers fail to notice a visual object or event; the object or 
event is clearly visible and detectable when observers look for 
it; and the failure to notice the object or event was not due to 
properties of the visual stimulus itself. The most damaging 
outcome of IB occurs when incomplete information leads to 
inaccurate representations of the external world that support 
incorrect decisions.  
Task Load. High workload can result in stimulus 
detection failure (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Recarte, 
Perez, Conchillo, & Nunes, 2008). Furthermore, individuals 
engaged in visual search for specific stimuli often exhibit 
decreased detection of unexpected stimuli (Most & Astur, 
2007). Researchers found that higher cognitive demands tend 
to reduce visual target detection and impair task performance 
(Reyes & Lee, 2008; Simons & Jensen, 2009; Strayer & 
Drews, 2007). In normal flight operations, pilots typically 
experience highest workload during take-off and landing 
(Wilson, 2002).   
Automation is often the chosen solution for cognitively 
overloaded operators. However, low workload can also induce 
attentional failures. In a simulated driving task conducted by 
Kennedy and Bliss (2013), participants who reported low 
mental demand while following automated navigational 
directives were more likely to experience IB to a task-relevant 
critical stimulus than those participants who reported higher 
mental demand. In part one of this study, participants 
monitoring flight automation were just as likely to exhibit IB 
to a critical stimulus as those flying manually (Kennedy, 
Stephens, Williams, & Schutte 2014). IB occurrence rates 
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exhibited during automation-induced underload were 
equivalent to those exhibited during high workload, in line 
with the extended-U model of stress and performance 
(Hancock & Warm, 1989; Kennedy & Bliss, 2013).  
The Malleable Attentional Resources Theory (MART) by 
Young and Stanton (2002) posited that the marked decrease in 
mental workload during periods of automation was due to 
attentional capacity varying directly with mental workload. 
Parasuraman and Manzey (2010) reported that maintaining 
appropriate attention is crucial for monitoring automated 
tasks. They found that without attention allocation, salient and 
critical information about an automated task could remain 
undetected despite eye fixations. They explained this 
automation-induced IB as automation complacency (AC). AC 
is defined as inferior detection of system malfunctions during 
periods of automation control as compared with those under 
manual control (Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010).  
Task load, reliability, and system failure rate modulate 
AC (Bailey & Scerbo, 2007; Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). 
The ideal circumstance for AC to occur is when an operator 
has a high, multiple-task load with a highly reliable 
automation system with infrequent and unexpected problems. 
The modern flight deck is just such an environment.  
Importantly, Parasuraman and Manzey (2010) reported 
that unless an operator has experience specific to automation 
failures, AC cannot be overcome with experience and practice. 
The goal of this portion of the study was to investigate this 
finding using a repeated induction of IB with participants in 
low, moderate, and high automation conditions and explore 
the attentional resource allocation (Young & Stanton, 2002).  
Current Study. This paper examines the relationship 
between levels of automation, workload, and IB occurrences 
for a task-relevant stimulus in a simulated flight task with 
repeated induction. This task utilized a simulated aircraft and 
three levels of flight control automation similar to autopilot, 
auto-throttle, and manual control. The measured outcome 
across automation conditions was IB occurrence for critical 
stimuli that were directly relevant and critical to primary task 
performance; specifically, two runway incursions. 
Participants completed a simplified landing task twice 
each with a critical stimulus runway incursion. Following the 
first induction, all subjects were asked questions that clearly 
indicated the importance of attending to visual information 
during landing (Kennedy, Stephens, Williams, & Schutte, 
2014). Next, subjects performed the second induction by 
performing the exact same landing task featuring a different 
critical stimulus runway incursion.  
We predicted an overall reduction of IB occurrence rates 
across automation conditions in the repeated induction of IB 
(Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010; Young & Stanton, 2002). We 
predicted fewest IB occurrences when workload was moderate 
(Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; Kennedy & Bliss, 2013; 
Kennedy, Stephens, Williams, & Schutte, 2014). Of interest 
was the exploration of the IB group membership changes 
(IB/Detect) across automation conditions. We predicted that 
those in the low workload condition could improve attentional 
resource allocation to increase detection rates during landing 
whereas those in the manual condition could not (Parasuraman 
& Manzey, 2010; Young & Stanton, 2002). 
 
 
METHOD 
 
Experimental Design  
 
The experimental task required non-pilot participants to 
twice perform the final five minutes of a simplified landing 
scenario. There were three automation conditions such that 
automation controlled all, some, or none of the aircraft 
operation similar to autopilot, auto-throttle, or manual control. 
The IB events occurred approximately 10 seconds before 
touchdown in both runs. In the first induction, the critical 
stimulus (a truck) began to move along a taxiway and 
intersected the active landing runway. The scenario ended just 
prior to touchdown, the simulation displays blanked, and the 
participant completed the post-experiment questionnaire. In 
the second induction, the critical stimulus (a plane) flew into 
ownship view in the airspace directly above the active landing 
runway. The simulation ended and the questionnaire followed 
as described. For a more detailed experimental description, 
please see Kennedy, Stephens, Williams, and Schutte, 2014. 
 
Participants 
 
Sixty participants (28 male, 31 female) completed this 
experiment and were compensated with $50. Subject age 
range was 20-64 (M=34.5, SD=13.3). Subjects were required 
to be non-pilots, over the age of 20, have normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and hearing.  
 
Materials 
 
Subjects signed an informed consent document and 
completed a background questionnaire to capture pertinent 
demographic information such as age, sex, abnormal vision or 
audition, and flight simulator experience. Subjects were given 
experimental instructions that described the flight simulator, 
the scenario, and the automation condition. Each subject 
performed three practice runs to achieve task proficiency. This 
study obtained Institutional Review Board approval at NASA.  
Experimental Manipulation. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of three automation condition for the entire 
experiment: full automation (FA), partial automation (PA), or 
no automation (NA). FA participants monitored the 
automation-controlled flight path and speed. PA participants 
manipulated flight path using a sidestick controller and 
monitored the speed. NA participants manipulated both the 
flight path using sidestick and speed using throttle. 
Participants with automation components were instructed to 
monitor the automation and report deviations. By design, no 
deviations existed and none were reported.  
Task. The flight scenario consisted of daytime flight 
conditions with greater than 3 miles of visibility and light 
turbulence. The flight task required participants to perform the 
final five minutes of a simplified simulated landing scenario 
and pilot the aircraft down to Runway 29 at Louisville 
International Airport (SDF). The total run from starting point 
to touchdown point covered a distance of approximately 8 nmi 
and lasted approximately 5 minutes. The specified airspeed 
was 180 knots until 2200 ft. then incorporated a speed 
reduction to 150 knots, which was to be maintained until 
touchdown. To avoid collision with critical stimuli, the 
simulation ended just prior to touchdown and the simulation 
displays blanked.  
System Description. Participants conducted the task using 
a flight simulator that provided a highly simplified level of 
flight control fidelity to accommodate the non-pilot 
participants. The flight model used a twin turbo-prop 
commuter plane. The environment provided an out-the-
window (OTW) view and a primary flight display (PFD) 
(Figure 1). The PFD displayed a repeated image of the OTW 
image and an instrumentation overlay with flight path marker 
with speed, altitude, and heading information (Figure 2).  
Critical Stimulus. The FAA defines a runway incursion 
(RI) as any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect 
presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area 
of a surface designed for the landing and take-off of aircraft 
(FAA, 2012). Seven vehicles were in the proximity of the 
landing runway: three non-moving, three moving, and one 
critical stimulus. The three moving vehicles were on the two 
taxiways adjacent to the active runway. All vehicles were in 
view for approximately 40 seconds and only the critical 
stimulus provided a conflict for any flight behaviors.  
The first experimental run utilized a Category B, Vehicle 
Deviation runway incursion in the form of an orange and 
white box truck (FAA, 2012). The truck was positioned on an 
intersecting taxiway, entered the active landing runway, and 
presented a direct collision threat to the landing aircraft 
(Figure 2). The critical stimulus triggered approximately 10 
seconds before the end of the scenario when the displays 
blanked, and the participant completed the post-experiment IB 
questionnaire.  
The second experimental run (repeated induction attempt) 
utilized a Category B, Pilot Deviation RI in the form of a red 
and white general aviation plane. The plane flew an 
intersecting flight path, entered the active landing runway 
airspace, and presented a direct threat to the landing aircraft 
(Figure 3). The critical stimulus was in motion for 
approximately 8 seconds. The scenario ended just prior to 
touchdown, displays blanked, and the participant completed 
the post-experiment IB questionnaire.  
IB Questionnaire. After each scenario, participants 
completed an IB questionnaire about flight behaviors 
exhibited during the experiment. The conventional assessment 
of IB is the failure of a participant to consciously perceive the 
critical stimulus such that he or she is unable to report 
detection of the stimulus. Consistent with Mack and Rock’s 
(1998) IB paradigm, the self-report post-experimental 
questionnaires prompted each participant to report detection of 
the critical stimulus. IB questions included “Did you see 
anything on or above the landing runway?” and “If so, please 
describe” for the participant to report detection. Participants 
who indicated that they did not detect the scenario specific 
critical stimulus were classified as exhibiting IB (Mack & 
Rock, 1998; Most & Astur, 2007). This technique indicates to 
the subject that there is something in the scene they did or did 
not detect which can influence the subject behavior in 
subsequent attempts to elicit IB. This prior exposure was 
intended and expected to influence the repeated induction.  
NASA-TLX. Participants completed the NASA-Task Load 
Index (TLX) to provide a subjective rating of perceived 
workload. Task load was defined as the cost incurred by 
human operators to achieve a specific level of task 
performance (Hart & Staveland, 1988). The NASA-TLX 
includes six elements of workload: mental demand, physical 
demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and 
frustration level. Both the overall and subscale score results 
were explored to investigate variations in task load for 
comparison with IB occurrences (Lee, Caven, Haake, & 
Brown, 2001; Nees & Walker, 2011).  
 
Procedure 
 
OTW 
Figure 2. The OTW and PFD images showing the view of the first 
runway incursion (truck) critical stimulus. 
PFD 
Figure 1. Experimental apparatus. 
Figure 3. The OTW and PFD images showing the view of the second 
runway incursion (airplane) critical stimulus. 
PFD 
OTW 
Subjects completed the Informed Consent Form and the 
background questionnaire. Next, subjects were randomly 
assigned to an automation condition and adjusted to the 
environment and equipment with three training runs. The three 
training runs used a scenario similar in operation to the test 
scenario but featured a Northerly approach to the SDF 
Runway 35L with no vehicles on or near the runway. 
Participants completed a post-training questionnaire and a 
NASA-TLX for the final practice run. Next, participants 
completed both experimental scenarios by piloting the 
simulated aircraft to Runway 29 with a Westerly approach. 
The screens blanked just prior to touchdown and participants 
completed the post-experiment IB questionnaires and NASA-
TLX forms. Participants completed the remainder of the full 
experiment and were debriefed.  
 
RESULTS 
 
This paper examined the relationship of automation and 
IB occurrences for a task-relevant stimulus in a simulated 
flight task with repeated induction; Time 1 (T1), Time 2 (T2).  
IB Across Induction. As predicted, the data revealed a 
decreased occurrence of IB across all conditions for T2 (50%, 
30 of 60) as compared to T1 (70%, 42 of 60). The automation 
condition with the lowest IB occurrence rates remained PA 
followed by FA and NA (See Figure 4).  
From first induction to second induction, the subjects who 
changed detection group membership varied within 
automation conditions (See Figure 5). Also, as predicted, 
although PA had the best detection rates numerically, the FA 
condition was the most improved. The IB group membership 
change (IB or Detect) across automation conditions showed 
that the FA condition decreased IB by half (85% to 45%), then 
PA (50% to 35%) with NA as the least improved (75% to 
70%). Approximately 70% of individuals remained in their 
original detection categories (IB to IB = 27, Detect to Detect = 
15). While 25% moved from IB to Detect (15), only 5% 
moved from Detect to IB (3). Across automation conditions, 
FA had 8 participants (40%) move from IB to Detect while PA 
had 5 and NA had just 2. PA had no members move from 
Detect to IB while PA had 2 and NA had 1. 
TLX Across Inductions. In T1, the TLX served as a 
manipulation check of task difficulty across automation 
conditions. Kennedy, Stephens, Williams, and Schutte, 2014 
confirmed that the overall NASA-TLX scores significantly 
differed between automation conditions and increased linearly 
from FA, to PA, to NA.  
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to 
determine the change in the TLX ratings from T1 to T2. The 
data were normally distributed with homogeneity of variances. 
Two outliers were identified by boxplot but retained as 
plausible values. Unlike T1, the scores for T2 did not follow a 
linear path and did not vary significantly by automation 
condition. As shown in Figure 6, the Overall TLX scores from 
T1 and T2 decreased for PA and NA but increased for FA. 
There were statistically significant interactions between 
Automation Condition and IB-induction (T1 vs. T2) on the 
overall TLX ratings, F(2, 57)=5.208, p<0.008, partial η2 = 
0.155, and the two subscales of Mental Demand, F(2, 57)=7.1, 
p<0.002, partial η2 = 0.199 and Effort F(2, 57)=5.456, 
p<0.007, partial η2 = 0.161. 
There was also a statistically 
significant main effect in the 
Performance subscale 
between T1 and T2, F(1, 
58)=5.627, p<0.021, partial 
η2 = 0.090. 
To further explore these differences, a one-way ANOVA 
was conducted on IB group membership and the difference in 
Mental Demand scores from T1 to T2. TLX Mental Demand 
scores significantly differed between IB group membership, 
F(3, 56)=3.060, p<0.036, partial η2 = 0.141. Although 
Figure 4. Number of IB occurrences grouped by automation condition 
for the first (truck) and second (plane) inductions. 
Figure 5. The change in detection membership (Detect or IB) from first to 
second induction including counts and grouped by automation condition. 
Figure 6. Time 1 and Time 2 TLX results showing the interaction effects for 
Overall TLX, Mental Demand, and Effort. Also showing the a significant main 
effect for Performance. 
ANOVA is robust, there were several assumption violations; 
these included unequal sample sizes, small cell sample sizes, 
and outliers.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Sixty non-pilot participants performed two simplified 
landing scenarios in one of three automation conditions; FA, 
PA, and NA. Each landing scenario included a critical event 
object that was of high importance to task performance (two 
types of RIs). This study explored repeated induction of a 
visual attention failure event across workload conditions. 
In the first IB attempt, the moderate workload condition 
(PA) performed the best with the low workload automation 
condition (FA) exhibiting high IB occurrences similar to those 
in the high workload condition (NA). The second IB attempt 
yielded reduced overall occurrences with the greatest 
improvement in the FA condition. This improvement 
coincided with a statistically significant increase in overall 
TLX, mental demand, and effort for the FA condition. These 
results suggest that the majority of participants in the FA 
condition recognized the first IB induction as a learning 
opportunity. With this experience of an unexpected event and 
questionnaire, these participants created and deployed an 
increased attentional awareness strategy which improved 
visual event detection, decreased IB, and increased workload. 
While the workload levels for FA increased, the workload 
levels for the PA and NA decreased making the three 
automation levels no longer significantly different. All 
conditions moved towards a more moderate level of workload 
which is best suited for optimum performance as shown in the 
extended-U model of stress and performance (Hancock & 
Warm, 1989). Although all conditions improved, no condition 
achieved a 100% detection rate.  
The capability of the cognitive system has a structurally-
based upper limit. This is represented in the number of 
individuals that improved automation condition (FA=8, PA=5, 
NA=2). The relationship demonstrated between automation 
condition and repeated induction of IB could have potential 
impact in informing the appropriate use of automated systems 
as an error mitigation strategy.  In particular, this research 
encourages consideration of the attention decrement and the 
attentional regulation behaviors required for successful task 
performance. 
With this in mind, any mitigation strategy for a visual 
attention failure like IB should be tailored to the cause. IB 
caused by high workload requires solutions that reduce 
workload (e.g., task shedding or automation). In this 
condition, performance could not benefit significantly by 
previous exposure or “seeing the trick.” However, during 
periods of low workload while simply monitoring highly 
reliable automation, IB decrements can come from automation 
complacency. Unlike high workload, AC can be reduced 
through awareness (Cartwright-Finch & Lavie, 2007; 
Parasuraman & Manzey, 2010). The IB induced by low 
workload was reduced by revealing automation complacency 
and the tendency for the participants to become poor monitors. 
At the outset of the second induction, all participants knew 
they would be asked about features in the environment. Those 
in the FA condition had the excess resources to use for 
attentional resource allocation during landing to improve 
performance whereas the high workload subjects did not. The 
NA condition did not allow an increased monitoring strategy 
because of the resources expended for manual control.  
Further understanding the individual differences can help 
explain those who detected both times and those who failed to 
detect both times. Research has found that people with higher 
working memory capacity can successfully perform tasks of 
higher complexity (Hurt, Angell, & Perez, 2011). The flight 
deck can, at times, be a highly complex, overwhelming 
environment but it can also become monotonous to the point 
of disengagement, which is a condition rife with attentional 
failure opportunity (Lee et al., 2001). 
Like high workload, low workload can induce a loss of 
attention. A pilot accustomed to highly reliable automation 
may experience automation-induced complacency and not 
recognize a time sensitive threat until the opportunity for 
intervention has passed. Although this study utilized a non-
pilot sample, the change rate in critical stimulus detection 
warrants further testing with a pilot population using targeted 
scenarios to explore individual differences and attentional 
failures including the targeted recapture of attention. 
In the National Airspace System of tomorrow, the role of 
automation in human error reduction continues to grow. 
Despite being increasingly rare, unpredictable events such as 
runway incursions and automation failure still require operator 
intervention. This line of research will help to identify 
situational and individual factors that increase occurrences of 
attention-related human error. By better understanding the 
cause of attentional events, we might hope to create mitigation 
strategies that ensure attention during maximized intervention 
opportunities without setting unrealistic expectations like 
constant vigilance.  
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